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 Should the State Pay for You To Have Kids? 
Emily McTernan argues against the state funding of infertility 
treatment 
The NHS offers up to three cycles of IVF to women under 40. Many other countries are 
far more generous. Yet this treatment isn’t cheap, and is often ineffective: in the UK, for 
women aged between 38 and 39, the failure rate per cycle is nearly 80%.[1] Here, I want 
to outline one argument against funding IVF. 
While some regard IVF as just one more part of a state-funded healthcare system, it 
doesn’t look much like the other healthcare we provide. It doesn’t alleviate physical pain, 
prolong life, increase mobility, or treat mental illness. There are also reasons for thinking 
that infertility is not a lack of normal functioning which demands treatment.[2] But some 
will say that, nonetheless, there is something special about having children, so that a 
state should fund fertility treatment. Yet having children is just one project or pursuit 
among many that can make for a valuable or meaningful life. People pursue a variety of 
different things to give their lives meaning and value, such as careers, intimate 
relationships, religion, or travel. So is there something so special about having children 
that the state should fund this one project—even though it very seldom directly funds the 
many other things that people think create meaning or value in their lives? 
First, you might think that people have a right to become parents, and a right of a kind 
that creates a claim to assistance from society. After all, the ability to marry and found a 
family is regarded as a human right. However, as Mary Warnock notes, this is a right not 
to be debarred from forming a family, not a right to assistance.[3] To see this, consider 
that few think that states should assist people to find marital partners, let alone that our 
human rights are violated if, say, the state doesn’t fund subscriptions to dating websites. 
Perhaps having a child of one’s own is different, though. Having a child of one’s own 
might seem like a biological imperative—a basic need like water, food and shelter—and 
so essential to human flourishing. Yet according to the Office of National Statistics, in 
2011, one in five UK women aged 45 had never given birth.[4] Do we want to say that all 
these women, some of them childless out of choice, fail to have their basic needs met or 
are unable to live flourishing lives? For a start, the evidence that having children 
increases overall life satisfaction or happiness is at best inconclusive.[5] For some at 
least, a life devoted to rearing children is unrewarding. Why else was Valium once 
labelled ‘mother’s little helper’? And, anyway, we should not disrespect those who 
choose to remain childless or to adopt, rather than having children of their own, by 
declaring that their choices leave them with lives that cannot flourish, where their basic 
needs have not been met. 
Nonetheless, one might think that children are a special case. Perhaps there is 
something unique in the bond between parent and child that justifies state funding, even 
though the state does not fund our other valuable relationships with friends, relatives, or 
lovers. Philosophers such as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift tell us that the parent–
child relationship has a unique moral quality, which means that it makes a distinctive 
contribution to our wellbeing and flourishing. Children are vulnerable and dependent, lack 
the ability to exit the relationship, and are initially trusting and unconditionally loving. As a 
result, parents have special responsibilities for their child’s wellbeing and development. 
Meeting these responsibilities, and so developing and exercising various capacities, 
contributes to parents having ‘fully flourishing lives’. Jurgen De Wisplaere and Daniel 
Weinstock think this is why states should promote the right to parent, assisting people to 
adopt or providing fertility treatment.[6] 
But are parental relationships so unique? Other intimate and caring relationships with 
friends, relatives, lovers, or pets share each of the features that Swift and Brighouse 
point to as making parenting unique, albeit sometimes more fleetingly. As friends, lovers, 
or relatives, we can care for those we are close to when they are vulnerable and help 
them develop future plans. Sometimes, we form caring relationships with those unable to 
exit or reciprocate and become responsible for their wellbeing, for instance, when caring 
for an elderly relative with dementia or an adult with severe disabilities. So too we can 
have valuable relationships with children who are not our own. Grandparents, teachers, 
godparents, and others might share responsibility for a child’s wellbeing and 
development, and so exercise very similar capacities to those involved in parenting. 
About all that is unique to the parent–child relationship, I suspect, is the degree of 
parental control over, and responsibility for, a child within the nuclear family structure. Yet 
to insist this is what makes having children of one’s own special is to privilege a very 
historically and socially particular form of family structure. Doing so also seems to deny 
or overlook the significance and value of many different relationships between adults and 
children, or among adults, instead, fetishising the biological parental relationship existing 
in the nuclear family. Finally, even if there is something unique in parent-child 
relationships, still that doesn’t show the state should fund forming this relationship. All 
intimate relationships are, in their own way, unique. There is nothing exactly like being an 
uncle, or a grandmother, or a close friend. Why then fund only this one kind of 
relationship? 
Hence, having children of one’s own doesn’t look special or unique in a way that grounds 
a claim for assistance. Given that the state does not directly fund other projects that 
people think make their lives valuable or meaningful, it is unclear why it should fund this 
one. 
However, there is one possible reason that the state should pay for you to have kids: if 
doing so is a form of compensation for injustice. Against a history of systematic 
discrimination often enforced or supported by the state, same-sex couples may now have 
grounds to claim state funding to assist in having children. Our society has systematically 
made it harder to form a family unit as a same-sex couple than as a heterosexual couple, 
through restricting marriage to heterosexual couples, inculcating strong social norms 
about what a ‘normal family’ looks like, and even passing laws making same-sex 
relations illegal. In contrast, the state has funded and encouraged heterosexual couples 
to have children. So, there is a reason for states to fund the creation of same-sex family 
units as a route to compensate, in part, those affected by current injustices facing same-
sex couples and the lasting effects of historic injustices. That funding may even be a 
benefit to society in general, through promoting a diversity in ways of life and forms of the 
family. 
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